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Economic theory predicts that top executives and lower-level employees have incentives to 
smooth income due to compensating wage differential costs and fear of job loss, respectively. 
Following Agrawal and Matsa (JFE, 2013) who rely on exogenous variations in unemployment 
insurance benefits to examine how unemployment concerns affect corporate leverage, we 
examine the link between such benefits and income smoothing. We find that when 
unemployment insurance benefits are higher and concerns about unemployment are hence lower, 
there is less income smoothing. This relation is stronger when employees face higher 
unemployment risk and weaker when the firms’ information and internal control environments 
are strong. Our study contributes to the literature by showing that labor market policies have a 
significant, likely unintended externality on corporate financial reporting. 
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1. Introduction 
In this study, we examine how unemployment concerns affect firms’ income smoothing 
behavior. Unemployment imposes significant economic, physiological, and psychological costs 
on workers (e.g., Diamond, 1982; Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Lazear, 2003; Mortensen, 1986; 
Wanberg, 2012). Workers are likely to be less concerned about unemployment if they are 
provided with reliefs such as unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in the event they are laid off. 
Prior theories and empirical evidence that link labor conditions to financial reporting choices 
typically focus on how the employment considerations of senior executives (e.g., bonus contracts 
and equity incentives) affect these choices (e.g., Healy, 1985; Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000; 
Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002; Goldman and Slezak, 2006). What is lacking in the literature 
is how unemployment concerns, especially those of broader groups of employees, impact these 
choices. Filling this gap can lead to a more holistic understanding of how labor conditions, 
particularly labor frictions such as unemployment, affect financial reporting outcomes. 
Firms prefer to report smooth income because markets perceive them as less risky 
compared to more volatile earnings (Graham et al., 2005). A large body of empirical literature 
finds results consistent with firms creating precautionary reserves during periods of strong 
performance and releasing these reserves during periods of poor performance in order to report 
smoother streams of income (e.g., see Land and Lang, 2002; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; 
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006).  
We expect concerns about unemployment to induce firm-level income smoothing through 
at least two avenues. First, it is well established in the labor economics literature that 
unemployment risk is costly to firms because employees concerned about the adverse effects of 
unemployment require firms to provide a wage premium (“compensating wage differential”) for 
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this risk exposure. The outcome is an increase in the firm’s compensation expenses (Abowd and 
Ashenfelter, 1981; Li, 1986). This compensating wage differential is not trivial. For example, 
Agrawal and Matsa (2013) conservatively estimate that when there are no UI benefits, the cost of 
compensating wage differentials to be over 150 basis points of firm value for a BBB-rated firm. 
We therefore argue that top executives have incentives to engage in income smoothing so that 
their firms appear less risky to their current as well as prospective employees, which, in turn, 
reduces compensating wage differentials and other related costs (e.g., the loss of productivity due 
to employees worried about unemployment). 
Second, job security concerns can lead to lower-level members of an organization (e.g., 
branch managers, store supervisors, salesmen, etc.) to not be completely truthful in their upward 
communications (e.g., see Cohen, 1958; Read, 1962). For example, one of the problems of 
setting earnings targets for division managers is that it puts pressure on them, and consequently 
on other workers in the division, to meet these targets; this pressure results in their hiding bad 
news or storing good news as cookie jar reserves when preparing divisional reports (Bruns and 
Merchant, 1990). Oberholzer-Gee and Wulf (2012) argue that managers further down in the firm 
hierarchy likely also have incentives, and perhaps even greater opportunity, to engage in 
earnings manipulation activities that include income smoothing. They illustrate this point using a 
Harvard Business School case about the H.J. Heinz Company, which is based on Heinz form 8-K 
dated April 27, 1979.1 In order to ensure that division managers at Heinz received bonuses in 
each reporting period, these managers engaged, without the knowledge of senior management, in 
a long list of improper accounting practices. These practices included manipulation of the timing 
of shipments, falsification of sale invoice dates, and improper recognition of advertising 
                                                           
1
 Post, R. and K. Goodpaster, “H.J. Heinz Company: The Administration of Policy,” HBS Case #382-034. Source: 
Heinz form 8-K, April 27, 1979, p. 2. 
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expenses. To the extent that lower-level employees engage in smoothing activities in reporting 
their performance, and they do not cancel out on average, such activities can lead to income 
smoothing outcomes at the firm level because financial statements incorporate information 
gathered from all levels of the organization.2   
Following Agrawal and Matsa (2013), we use exogenous inter-state cross-sectional and 
intra-state time-series variations in United States UI benefits to identify differences and changes 
in unemployment concerns (that is, the more generous the benefits, the lower the concerns). Our 
goal is to investigate whether firms’ income smoothing behavior is affected by these concerns.  
Similar to Agrawal and Matsa (2013), we argue that this approach enables us to identify the 
impact of shocks to concerns about unemployment on corporate financial reports because legally 
mandated increases in UI payments by states reduce the costs workers face when unemployed.3  
Following prior literature, we capture income smoothing in terms of the negative correlation 
between operating cash flows and accruals (e.g., see Land and Lang, 2002; Lang, Raedy, and 
Wilson, 2006; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006).   
Using a sample period that spans from 1964 to 2012, we find evidence that greater 
unemployment concerns (as indicated by lower benefits) increase income smoothing. 
Specifically, we find that UI benefits, which should allay employees’ concerns about getting laid 
off, reduce the firms’ income smoothing behavior. This relation remains robust after several 
controls are employed to take account of industry effects, year effects, state-level industry 
concentration, firm invariant factors, and state invariant factors.   
                                                           
2
 Presenting a somewhat parallel argument that lower-level workers can indeed influence corporate outcomes, a 
recent paper by Bova et al. (2015) documents that nonexecutive employees are able to affect corporate risk-taking. 
Similarly, Garrett, Hoitash, and Prawitt (2014) find a positive relation between organizational trust and financial 
reporting quality with trust measured at both the higher and lower ranks of a firm. 
3
 Agrawal and Matsa (2013) show that increases in state UI benefits are associated with greater state UI payouts. 
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We also conduct several cross-sectional analyses to further our understanding of the 
effects of unemployment concerns on income smoothing. Recognizing that employees’ concern 
about unemployment is a function of both the generosity of UI benefits and the risk of being 
unemployed, we first investigate whether the propensity to engage in income smoothing 
increases with the risk of unemployment. As the value of UI benefits is especially salient when 
unemployment risk is high, we hypothesize that the role of UI benefits in curbing income 
smoothing is greater when unemployment risk is high. We investigate this by using firm leverage 
and the state-level prevalence of collective bargaining agreements to capture unemployment risk. 
Unemployment risk increases when a firm is more leveraged, while it decreases if employees are 
covered by union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements. Our findings are as predicted. In 
addition to finding that the role of UI benefits in reducing income smoothing is greater when 
unemployment risk is high, we also find evidence of a general positive relation between income 
smoothing and unemployment risk.  
A firm’s ability to engage in discretionary reporting behavior, such as income smoothing, 
is likely curtailed when it is operating in a strong information and internal control environment. 
Because strong information and internal controls inhibit income smoothing behavior in the first 
place, the role of UI benefits in reducing income smoothing should be further attenuated in such 
environments. We argue that firms’ internal control environments have improved and that their 
propensity to manage earnings has decreased following the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
of 2002 (SOX) (Bartov and Cohen, 2009; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Hutton, Marcus, and 
Tehranian, 2009; Lobo and Zhou, 2006). Accordingly, we hypothesize and find results 
suggesting that the negative relation between UI benefits and income smoothing has weakened 
post SOX. We also investigate a post-SOX sample and evaluate whether the link between UI 
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benefits and income smoothing differs between firms that are identified as having material 
internal control weaknesses and those that are not. Firms with material internal control 
weaknesses are expected to engage in more earnings management activities ceteris paribus, and 
hence the role of UI benefits in attenuating income smoothing should be greater for these firms. 
Our empirical findings confirm this conjecture as well.  
The results of these cross-sectional tests enhance our confidence that the main empirical 
findings we observe are indeed related to UI benefits and, by extension, unemployment concerns 
in general. All our results remain robust when we employ smaller samples, where additional 
state-level controls are employed, and industries with disperse workforces are removed.  
In further analyses, we examine the impact of UI benefits on financial reporting quality. 
If unemployment concerns lead to income smoothing, then such concerns should result in lower 
financial reporting quality, as smoothing activities inhibit the ability of financial reports to 
present firm performance in a given period. Accordingly, UI benefits should result in improved 
financial reporting quality consequent to its effect on curtailing income smoothing. We measure 
financial reporting quality in terms of financial statement opacity (Hutton, Marcus, and 
Tehranian, 2009) and accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Our findings are as 
predicted. We indeed find that UI benefits are associated with higher financial reporting quality.    
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, even though the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recognizes employees as a primary group of financial 
statement users, few studies investigate whether financial reporting choices are influenced by 
broad labor considerations (e.g., Hamm, Jung, and Lee, 2013; Liberty and Zimmerman, 1986).4 
In contrast, a large body of literature documents how the remuneration of top executives 
(typically, CEOs and CFOs) influences firms’ financial reporting quality (e.g., see Healy and 
                                                           
4
 FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8, OB2 and BC1.10. 
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Wahlen, 1999; Kothari, 2001). Second, the extant literature on how corporate behavior is 
affected by UI benefits investigates issues ranging from wage-setting (e.g., see Abowd and 
Ashenfelter, 1981; Hamermesh and Wolfe, 1990; Li, 1986; Topel, 1984) to layoff (Topel, 1983) 
and corporate leverage decisions (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013). Given the prior evidence that UI 
benefits affect real decisions of a firm, it becomes a natural question whether they also influence 
firm-level reporting decisions. In this paper, we use established identification techniques to 
provide strong evidence that state UI benefits affect corporate financial reporting decisions as 
well. Hence, we add to the growing literature about the externalities of UI (e.g., Dou, Khan, and 
Zou, 2014; Hsu, Matsa, and Melzer, 2014). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the 
hypotheses. Section three describes the data and empirical design. Section four presents the 
results and robustness tests. Section five concludes.     
2. Hypotheses Development 
 In the United States, the Federal-State UI Program is an important safety net that 
provides temporary income to eligible workers who are unemployed through no fault of their 
own.5 Based on guidelines under federal law, each state administers a separate UI program. State 
laws determine the eligibility, amounts, and the duration of UI benefits. Most states fund their 
programs with taxation on employers, with three states requiring minimal employee 
contributions. The taxes imposed on the firms vary based on past experiences; firms that have 
had more worker unemployment claims in the past pay higher taxes.6 Claims for UI benefits are 
paid by state governments, which are allowed to tap federal funds after they use up their 
resources or reach certain rates of aggregate unemployment. Benefits are typically based on a 
                                                           
5
 http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp.  
6
 See, for example, the determination of UI tax rates in Washington State: 
http://www.esd.wa.gov/newsandinformation/faq/tax-rate-update-6-10.php.   
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percentage of an individual’s earnings over the most recent 52-week period and are limited to a 
maximum amount stipulated by the state. Most states allow for a maximum of 26 weeks of 
benefits.7 
 Many factors can lead to variation in UI benefits across states and times. Key factors 
include underlying economic conditions (e.g., higher average wages) and political forces (e.g., 
bolstering of political support). The direct effect of the UI program is on unemployed workers. 
Gruber (1997) argues that the primary benefit of UI benefits is to smooth consumption during 
periods of unemployment. In particular, he argues that pooling unemployment risk through 
insurance leads to greater efficiency and provides evidence that consumption would fall 
significantly in the absence of UI. Other studies have found that UI is associated with workers’ 
searches for new employment and the durations of their unemployment spells, labor productivity, 
savings, and stock market participation (e.g., Feldstein, 1978; Topel and Welch, 1980; Moffitt, 
1985; Katz and Meyer, 1990; Meyer, 1995; Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000; Gormley, Liu, and 
Shou, 2010; Engen and Gruber, 2001; Meyer and Mok, 2007). Hsu et al. (2014) find that UI 
benefits help the unemployed avoid defaulting on their mortgage debt, and, as a result, banks 
expand credit access and offer reduced interest rates to low-income households. 
For firms, UI programs have a direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect is the taxes 
that firms pay to fund the program. The indirect effect is via firms’ consideration of the impact of 
UI benefits on their workers. Topel (1983) finds that firms are more willing to lay off workers 
when workers are more protected by UI. Agrawal and Matsa (2013) hypothesize that firms will 
choose financial policies that decrease the risk of distress and costly layoffs when their workers 
are less protected by UI programs, because workers will demand higher compensation for 
                                                           
7
 For a more detailed discussion of the institutional background of UI programs in the United States, see Agrawal 
and Matsa (2013). 
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potential job loss. Consistent with their hypothesis, they find that higher unemployment benefits 
lead to increased corporate leverage. 
2.1  The Relation between UI and Income Smoothing 
In this paper, we argue that unemployment concerns potentially impact managerial 
decisions on financial reporting because both existing and prospective employees likely use 
firms’ accounting information to assess unemployment risk. As higher risks of unemployment 
lead to higher compensating wage differentials, firms have incentives to present its employment 
prospects in a more positive manner. These compensating wage differentials can impose quite 
substantial costs on the firm. For example, employing conservative assumptions, Agrawal and 
Matsa (2013) estimate the cost of compensating wage differentials to be 154 basis points of firm 
value for a BBB-rated firm when there are no UI benefits. Chemmanur et al. (2013) find the 
incremental labor costs associated with higher unemployment risk, due to added leverage, to be 
large enough to offset the tax-shield benefits of debt. Therefore, managers concerned about these 
costs should have incentives to project the firm as being less risky to its current and prospective 
employees.  
Markets perceive volatile earnings as symptomatic of firm risk. Consequently, managers 
exhibit a proclivity to engage in income smoothing activities. For example, Graham et al. (2005) 
report that 97% of the senior managers responding to their survey indicate a preference for 
smooth income, and as many as 78% of managers indicate a willingness to sacrifice economic 
value in order to achieve it. Moreover, 89% of respondents express the belief that smoother 
earnings are perceived as less risky by the market. Consistent with the survey evidence, a large 
body of empirical literature reports the use of accruals to achieve smoother income (e.g., see 
Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen, 1995; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Yang, 2004; Kilic et al., 
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2013; Land and Lang, 2002; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; 
Liu and Ryan, 2006; Wahlen, 1994). In essence, these papers suggest that managers use accruals 
to build precautionary reserves during periods of strong performance and release these accrual 
reserves in subsequent periods of poor performance. 
While the managerial propensity for income smoothing is well established in the 
literature, it is also possible that some lower-level employees (e.g., branch managers, store 
supervisors, and salesmen) engage in certain smoothing activities when reporting their 
performance, especially if they are under pressure to meet profit or sales targets.8 These 
employees typically face asymmetric incentives in that they do not benefit much (e.g., limited 
bonus, if any) from reporting extreme good news, but they expose themselves to significant 
unemployment risk by reporting extreme bad news. The incentives to report smoother outputs 
are likely especially high for them. Their risk tolerance is arguably lower than that of top 
management, due to both lower wealth levels (the endowment effect) and a lack of high power 
incentives (the incentive effect). Hence, as with top executives, they are also likely to have 
incentives to create cookie jar reserves to store good news and release them during rainy days. 
Financial statements incorporate information gathered from all levels of the organization and 
such information provide inputs into accrual estimations. To the extent that smoothing activities 
at the lower levels are reflected in consolidated financial statements, they will manifest as 
income smoothing in firm-level financial reports.9 Consistent with the broader premise that 
financial reporting outcomes can also be affected by lower-level workers, Garrett, Hoitash, and 
                                                           
8
 In fact, a sizeable body of literature on organizational behavior and marketing shows the discretion used by lower-
level members of power hierarchies in their upward communications (e.g., see Cohen, 1958; Fornell and Westbrook, 
1984; Harris and Ogbonna, 2010; Homburg and Fürst, 2007; Read, 1962).  
9
 A necessary condition here is that performance at individual/ sub-unit levels are not negatively correlated so that 
the lower-level smoothing effects do not cancel out in aggregate.   
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Prawitt (2014) find a positive relation between organizational trust and financial reporting 
quality when trust is measured not only at higher ranks, but also at the lower ranks of the firm. 
In the United States, workers’ concerns about future unemployment are partially 
mitigated by the presence of UI benefits programs, as these programs provide unemployment 
income for workers in the event that they are laid off. A simple way of illustrating the impact of 
the UI program is to rely on the following equation: 
Expected unemployment income (inverse proxy for unemployment concerns)  
= Unemployment risk x UI benefits.    
Note that when expected unemployment income is higher, there is less concern about 
future unemployment. Expected unemployment income is a function of the risk of layoff and UI 
benefits. Following Agrawal and Matsa (2013), we use exogenous changes in state-level UI 
benefits to empirically capture exogenous changes in unemployment concerns. As previously 
argued, if greater unemployment concerns indeed result in more income smoothing, because 
managers want to avoid paying high compensating wage differentials and/or workers want to 
avoid negative job consequences, such behavior should be curtailed when high UI benefits are 
present, so that concerns about unemployment are diminished. Accordingly, we would expect 
income smoothing to be negatively associated with UI benefits. Hence, our primary hypothesis is 
as follows (alternative form): 
Hypothesis H1: Income smoothing is negatively associated with UI benefits. 
It is worth noting, however, that a number of factors work against the propensity to 
smooth income in general. For example, managers may choose to report truthfully during periods 
of strong performance due to self-serving or capital-market-related reasons, which in turn 
inhibits the creation of precautionary reserves that can be released in later, less favorable times. 
11 
 
Employees may find it difficult to use discretion in their reporting due to monitoring by fellow 
employees, or smoothing activities at lower levels of the organization may not get reflected in 
firm-level financial reports in a predictable manner. Finally, firms’ information and control 
environments will inhibit discretionary reporting at all levels of the organization.10 The extent to 
which these countervailing factors prevail would weaken the relation hypothesized in H1 and 
would work against us finding supporting empirical results.  
2.2  The Effect of Unemployment Risk  
Clearly, there is a direct link between unemployment risk and the usefulness of UI 
benefits. As can be seen from equation (1), no income is expected from UI benefits if the layoff 
probability is zero. As unemployment risk increases, so does the expected unemployment 
income.  
Unemployment risk can be thought of as stemming from one of several sources. While 
employees’ layoff concerns should remain regardless of the source of risk, not all are equally 
relevant in the context of the relation between income smoothing and UI benefits. The most 
pertinent in this regard is firm-level unemployment risk. There is a clear, positive relation 
between firm-level risk and the magnitude of compensating wage differentials. For example, 
Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2013) find a positive relation between leverage and 
compensation costs. According to their analyses, the incremental labor expense associated with 
leverage-driven risk increases is large enough to offset the incremental tax-shield benefits of 
debt. According to Agrawal and Matsa’s (2013) estimates, the cost of compensating wage 
differentials for a firm with an AAA credit rating is only 0.02 percent of firm value even in the 
absence of any UI benefits. However, this cost goes up to 4.28 percent of firm value for a riskier 
firm with a B credit rating. Accordingly, the incentives of both lower-level employees and senior 
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 We further explore this conjecture in our third hypothesis. 
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managers to engage in smoothing activities will be particularly high when the firm is riskier or 
perceived to be riskier. If so, the role of generous UI benefits in attenuating income smoothing 
behavior should be particularly strong for riskier firms.11 It is also worth noting that some firms 
have institutional arrangements such as collective bargaining power agreements that stipulate 
policies on issues like employee dismissal and severance pay (Abraham and Medoff, 1984; 
Booth, 1995). The presence of such arrangements should potentially reduce the firm-level 
unemployment risk and weaken the association between income smoothing and UI benefits.12 
While employee-specific factors (e.g. skill level, work ethic etc.,) can also influence worker-
level unemployment risk and the utility of UI benefits to employees, these factors are unlikely to 
affect compensation wage differentials or the link between income smoothing and UI benefits in 
a systematic manner. 
Accordingly, we expect unemployment risk to strengthen the association between income 
smoothing and UI benefits only when risk is captured at the firm level. Therefore, we posit that; 
Hypothesis H2: The negative association between income smoothing and UI 
benefits is stronger when the risk of unemployment from firm-level factors is high. 
2.3 The Effect of the Information and Internal Control Environment 
The information and internal control environment of firms play a significant role in 
maintaining the integrity of the financial reporting process. The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission rules define internal control over financial reporting as “a process designed by, or 
under the supervision of, the [company’s] principal executive and principal financial officers… 
                                                           
11
 Suggesting that UI benefits have a greater impact on riskier firms, Agrawal and Matsa (2013) find that the 
presence of UI programs reduce the costs of compensating wage differentials by 269 and 97 basis points of firm 
value, respectively, for B- and BBB-rated firms, but only by 10 and 1 basis points, respectively, for A- and AAA-
rated firms. 
12
 Unemployment risk could also arise from macroeconomic risk. High unemployment rate is symptomatic of 
economic downturns. However, it is unlikely that macro economy-driven unemployment risk increases 
compensating wage differentials. The reason is that alternative job opportunities are scarce and the employee’s 
bargaining power is lower during economic downturns. 
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to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the 
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with GAAP…” (Source: 
Securities Exchange Act Rule 13a-15(f)). An environment with strong internal controls is 
characterized by the presence of systems and procedures ensuring that sufficient controls are in 
place to prevent and detect the inappropriate use of journal entries, adjustments, estimates etc., in 
order to achieve desired financial reporting outcomes. Moreover, strong internal control systems 
should also be capable of preventing and detecting fraud and misreporting at lower levels of the 
organization. In sum, the presence of a strong information and internal control environment 
should curtail the likelihood of discretionary reporting at all levels of the organization.  
Consistent with the above notion, a number of studies establish a strong relation between 
internal control quality and accruals quality (Altamuro and Beatty, 2010; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2008; Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 2007). Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that the adoption of 
SOX, which significantly improved firms’ information and internal quality environments, has 
reduced the use of accruals for earnings management purposes (Bartov and Cohen, 2009; Cohen, 
Dey, and Lys, 2008; Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009; Lobo and Zhou, 2006). 
Accordingly, we conjecture that income smoothing due to unemployment concerns is 
curtailed in environments with strong information and internal control systems in the first place. 
If so, the incremental role of UI in mitigating income smoothing behavior should be less 
pronounced in such environments. Therefore, we present our third hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis H3: The negative association between income smoothing and UI 
benefits is weaker when the information and internal control environment is 
strong. 
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3.  Data and Empirical Framework 
Unlike most other countries, the level of UI benefits in the U.S. is determined at the state 
level, as opposed to the federal level. Moreover, there are time-series variations in UI benefits at 
the state level. We use these cross-sectional (across states) and time-series (within state) 
variations in UI benefits to test our conjecture of a link between income smoothing and 
unemployment concerns.  
3.1  Data 
 We obtain data on UI benefits from the U.S. Department of Labor’s annual issues of 
Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws and data on firm financials from 
Compustat.13 We combine firm-level financial information with state-level UI benefits based on 
the state in which the firm’s headquarter is located.14 We use financial statement data from 1964 
to 2012 and the corresponding unemployment insurance data with a one year lag (1963-2011). 
We exclude firms in financial services and utilities industries (SIC 6000-6999 and SIC 4900-
4948). After ensuring data sufficiency to compute all control variables, the sample size used in 
testing our primary hypothesis varies from 128,856 to 155,404.    
3.2  Measurement of UI Benefits 
 To analyze the impact of UI benefits on financial reporting, we use the maximum amount 
of unemployment benefits (UI) allowed for each state in a given year, defined as the maximum 
number of weeks that a state provides benefits to claimants (Max Duration), times the maximum 
weekly benefit amount (Max Weekly Benefit). This variable provides a proxy for the total UI 
                                                           
13
 http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp#sigprouilaws. 
14
 This matching criterion creates some measurement error with respect to the variable of interest if some of the 
firm’s workers are located outside of the headquarters-state, since employees are covered by the UI laws of the state 
in which they are employed. Following Agrawal and Matsa (2013), we address this issue in additional analyses by 
excluding industries with a dispersed workforce; we find similar results. See Section 4.4.2. 
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benefits that a claimant can receive in a given year and has been shown to impact firms’ financial 
policies (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013).  
Broad trends in state UI benefits over the sample period are presented in Figures 1 and 2. 
Figure 1 indicates the quartile of a state’s increase in maximum total UI benefits by decade. As 
can be seen, the distribution appears heterogeneous and there are no prominent time-series trends 
in terms of regions. Figure 2 presents the distribution of UI benefit increases over each decade in 
our sample. On average, states appear to increase UI benefits by 25-75% over a decade. Larger 
increases are not that uncommon, representing about 30% of the sample. While no clear time 
trend is visible, except that UI benefits increase over time at varying rates, we employ year fixed 
effects in all our empirical specifications. Panel A of Table 1 presents the means of maximum 
weekly UI benefits, maximum duration, and the maximum total UI benefits by state over our 
sample period. While there is little variation in the maximum number of weeks a worker can 
claim unemployment benefits, with an average of 26 weeks across most states, the maximum 
amount of mean weekly (total) benefits varies significantly, ranging from a low of $125 ($3,259) 
in Mississippi to a high of $393 ($11,785) in Massachusetts. Panel B shows the mean values of 
the maximum weekly benefit, maximum duration, and total benefits for each year in our sample 
period.  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1] 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the study. The mean 
maximum UI benefit over our sample period is $6,610 with 25th and 75th percentiles of $3,820 
and $8,580, respectively. One might look at these maximum benefits and consider them to be 
small relative to at least what some workers were receiving as employment income prior to being 
laid off. From a utility (or economic importance) perspective, it is important to note that the 
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utility of a dollar of employment income is likely to be lower than the utility of a dollar of 
unemployment income because of the diminishing marginal utility of income. A key reason is 
that the earlier and later dollars are likely to be spent on necessities and discretionary items, 
respectively. UI benefits provide an important economic lifeline to many who have lost their 
jobs. It is also important to note that involuntary unemployment tends to increase sharply during 
periods of economic crisis when the wealth of many individuals has fallen significantly and there 
are few job opportunities. The marginal utility per dollar of income – in particular, 
unemployment income – is likely to be greater during these periods. In fact, prior studies that 
document links between UI benefits and corporate leverage (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013) and 
banks’ consumer credit decisions (Hsu et al., 2014) suggest that the impact of these benefits on 
the employee is nontrivial. 
[Insert Table 2] 
3.3  Regression Specification 
 We follow the prior literature and capture firms’ income smoothing behavior in terms of 
the negative correlation between operating cash flows and accruals (e.g., see Land and Lang, 
2002; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; Tucker and Zarowin, 
2006). The intuition here is that income smoothing incentives will result in a firm making 
negative accruals in periods of strong performance (thereby creating precautionary reserves) and 
positive accruals in periods of weak performance (releasing of reserves). The firm’s fundamental 
performance is proxied by operating cash flows. While a negative correlation between operating 
cash flows and accruals can be a natural result of accruals accounting (Dechow, 1994), the 
literature recognizes that a larger magnitude of this relation that varies in a systematic manner, as 
predicted by earnings management incentives, reflects income smoothing behavior. The above 
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approach to capturing income smoothing is also prevalent in the banking literature, where 
smoothing propensity is measured in terms of the correlation between income before provisions, 
equivalent to operating cash flows for banks, and loan loss provisions, the largest accrual for 
banks (e.g., see Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen, 1995; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Yang, 2004; 
Kilic et al., 2013; Liu and Ryan, 2006; Wahlen, 1994).  
  Following prior literature (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Sloan, 1996), we 
measure accruals as: Accruals = (∆CA – ∆Cash) – (∆CL – ∆STD – ∆TP) – Dep, where ∆CA = 
the change in current assets, ∆Cash = the change in cash/cash equivalents, ∆CL = the change in 
current liabilities, ∆STD = the change in debt included in current liabilities, ∆TP = the change in 
income taxes payable, and Dep = depreciation and amortization expense. Having computed 
accruals, we then define the following variables: 
 Accruals = accruals / average total assets.      (1) 
 CFO = (income from continuing operations – accruals) / average total assets. (2) 
CFO is cash flow from operations, and average total assets is the average of the 
beginning and ending book value of total assets. Following the prior literature, a basic model of 
income smoothing can be depicted as: 
Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt + βnControlst + e.       (3) 
Controls represents the vector of variables that attempts to capture the economic 
determinants of normal/non-discretionary accruals. We rely on the prior literature to determine 
the two sets of variables to be included. For the first set, we follow Jones (1991) and many 
subsequent papers (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995). Based on her model of normal accruals, we 
include ∆Revenuet and PPEt, where ∆Revenuet is the change in revenue from t-1 to t, scaled by 
average total assets and PPEt is gross plant, property, and equipment at time t, scaled by average 
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total assets. We also include the log of total assets at time t, Log_Assetst, to control for any size-
related effects on accruals.  
For the second set of control variables, we follow Dechow and Dichev (2002) and 
include CFOt-1 and CFOt+1 into the first set of control variables to take into account the mapping 
of current accruals into last-period and next-period cash flows.15 Controlling for these cash 
flows, which are correlated to contemporaneous cash flows, is potentially important because our 
paper focuses on how accruals are conditional on contemporaneous cash flows. However, the 
inclusion of lag and lead cash flow from operations increases data requirements, which results in 
a smaller sample size. 
Macroeconomic growth, in addition to firm-specific revenue growth, could reflect growth 
opportunities that may affect the normal level of accruals. Hence, we control for state-level 
growth, GDP_Growtht, in all our empirical specifications. Finally, we include year fixed effects 
to control for general time trends in the accruals process, if any, and aggregate macroeconomic 
conditions that vary with time.16 We also employ industry fixed effects based on the Fama 
French 48-industries classification to control for potential within industry variations in accruals. 
A remaining concern involves state-level industry concentration. In order to ensure that the 
results are not due to state-level industry concentrations that vary through time along with state 
UI benefits, we also employ a specification with industry fixed effects replaced by industry-state 
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 While the basic Dechow and Dichev (2002) model does not include changes in revenue and gross plant, property, 
and equipment, McNichols (2002), in her discussion of this model, suggests including changes in revenues and gross 
plant, property, and equipment as additional explanatory measures. Subsequent studies (e.g., Francis et al., 2004, 
2005; Ng, 2011) typically use the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model that is augmented by these measures. 
16
 Note that year fixed effects effectively capture country-level macroeconomic factors, which are the same for all 
firms within a year. 
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fixed effects, where industry-state is defined as the products of state and industry.17 We cluster 
standard errors by state to correct for potential correlations among firms within the same state.18 
 In Eq. (3), the coefficient on CFOt, β1, represents the extent to which accruals are 
discretionally used to smooth earnings conditional on cash flow from operations. Note that by 
construction, CFO is income from continuing operations before accruals and thus could be 
considered as a proxy of the earnings signal prior to the use of accruals to smooth income. 
 To examine the relation between UI benefits and income smoothing, we extend Eq. (3) as 
follows: 
Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt×UIt-1 + β2CFOt + β3UIt-1 + βnControlst + e.   (4) 
UI is included in the specification as a lagged variable because we argue that changes in UI 
would lead to changes in income smoothing behavior. Our coefficient of interest is the one on 
the interaction term CFOt×UIt-1 (β1). If, as hypothesized in H1, UI benefits indeed alleviate 
firms’ income smoothing behavior, we would expect this interaction coefficient to be 
significantly positive.  
4.  Results 
4.1 Test of H1: Relation between UI Benefits and Income Smoothing 
Table 3 presents results for the tests of our main hypothesis that income smoothing is 
negatively associated with the level of state-level UI benefits. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
results with industry and year fixed effects while columns (3) and (4) report the corresponding 
results with industry fixed effects replaced by industry-state fixed effects. The results are very 
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 In additional tests, we also employ firm and state fixed effects. The choice of fixed effects does not impact our 
inferences. See Section 4.4.1. 
18
 Agrawal and Matsa (2013) argue that it is more appropriate to cluster at the state level because the variation in UI 
benefits is at the state level, and that doing so controls for potential time-varying correlations in unobserved factors 
that affect different firms within the same state. They also argue that this also corrects for within-firm error term 
correlations over time, so it is more general than firm-level clustering. 
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similar across all specifications. The coefficient on CFOt is reliably negative, suggestive of 
income smoothing behavior as reported in the prior literature. More importantly, the coefficient 
on interaction term CFOt×UIt-1, our coefficient on interest, is positive and significant across all 
columns. This finding suggests that, as hypothesized in H1, UI benefits reduce the firms’ 
propensity to engage in income smoothing activities.   
[Insert Table 3] 
 We now examine whether the relation between UI benefits and income smoothing varies 
across the dimensions hypothesized in H2 and H3 to provide further support for our argument 
that unemployment concerns lead to more income smoothing.  
4.2 Test of H2: The Effect of Unemployment Risk 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that the role of UI benefits in reducing income smoothing should 
be stronger when the firm-level risk of unemployment is higher. This is due to both 
compensating wage differentials being greater and lower-level workers’ incentives to engage in 
discretionary reporting behavior being higher when the firm-level unemployment risk is greater. 
Accordingly, the impact of UI benefits in mitigating income smoothing behavior should be 
stronger in this context.   
 We use two empirical proxies to investigate this relation. First, we capture unemployment 
risk through firm leverage (Leverage). The choice of leverage as the empirical construct is driven 
by prior literature that links leverage to firm-level unemployment risk and, consequently, to 
compensating wage differentials. For example, Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010) analytically 
demonstrate that firms with higher leverage should pay higher wages as compensation for the 
added risk of unemployment. Their predictions are empirically supported by Chemmanur, 
Cheng, and Zhang (2013), who find a both statistically and economically significant positive 
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relation between leverage and labor costs. Moreover, positing a direct link between leverage and 
unemployment risk, Agrawal and Matsa (2013) show that firms increase leverage following 
increases in UI benefits. 
 As argued in Section 2.2, certain features of institutional arrangements between the firm 
and employees, such as collective bargaining agreements, are designed to reduce employees’ 
unemployment risk exposure. Collective bargaining agreements are prevalent in highly 
unionized settings, and these agreements cover a wide range of employment-related issues such 
as life and health insurance, pay, hours, holidays, employee dismissal, and severance pay (e.g., 
see Booth, 1995). It is widely understood that it is more difficult and/or costly to lay off 
employees who are covered by collective bargaining agreements. Abraham and Medoff (1984) 
find that written rules to deal with permanent layoffs are present in 92% of unionized firms, but 
only in 24% of nonunionized firms.19 These written rules are typically incorporated into 
collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, Budd and McCall (1997, 2004) find that 
unionization significantly increases the likelihood of a low-level worker receiving UI benefits 
because unions act as an important information conduit regarding the UI benefit system. 
Therefore, both the risk and cost of unemployment should be lower for unionized employees 
who are covered by collective bargaining agreements. To capture the role of institutional 
arrangements to mitigate unemployment risk, we use the percentage of employees covered by 
collective bargaining power agreements (Coverage) as our second empirical proxy in testing 
hypothesis H2. While Coverage should ideally be measured at the firm level, data limitations 
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 On a related note, Gibbons and Katz (1991) argue that it is easier for employees of unionized firms to find 
reemployment in the event of a layoff. The rationale is that in nonunionized settings, where firms have discretion 
about whom to lay off, the market infers that laid-off workers are of low ability. However, such inferences cannot be 
made in unionized settings since most jobs covered by collective bargaining agreements are governed by layoff-by-
seniority rules. 
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prevent us from doing so. Therefore, we measure this construct at the state-year level with data 
from the Unionstats database maintained by Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson.20  
 We test hypothesis H2 by introducing Leverage (Coverage) into Eq. (4) along with the 
three-way interaction term CFOt×UIt-1×Leveraget (CFOt×UIt-1×Coveraget) and the related two-
way interactions. As unemployment risk is increasing (decreasing) in Leverage (Coverage), 
hypothesis H2 predicts a positive (negative) coefficient on the three-way interaction term. 
Specifically, we employ the following models for our tests of hypothesis H2: 
Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt×UIt-1×Leveraget + β2UIt-1×Leveraget + β3CFOt×Leveraget + 
β4Leveraget + β5CFOt×UIt-1 + β6CFOt + β7UIt-1 + βnControls + e.    (5) 
Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt×UIt-1×Coveraget + β2UIt-1×Coveraget + β3CFOt×Coveraget + 
β4Coveraget + β5CFOt×UIt-1 + β6CFOt + β7UIt-1 + βnControls + e.   (6) 
 These results are presented in Table 4. Panel A of Table 4 reports regression results for 
Eq. (5), while those for Eq. (6) are reported in Panel B.  In Table 4, Panel A, the coefficient on 
the two-way interaction term CFOt×Leveraget is negative across all specifications, suggesting 
that the propensity to smooth income is increasing in leverage. This finding is in line with the 
expectation that firms with higher risk face greater pressures to smooth income. More 
importantly, our coefficient of interest, the one on the three-way interaction term CFOt×UIt-
1×Leveraget, is positive and significant, as predicted by hypothesis H2. This suggests that the 
propensity to smooth income due to unemployment concerns is increasing in firm risk.  
We get further evidence in support of hypothesis H2, when Coverage is used as an 
inverse proxy for firm-level unemployment risk. As can be seen from Panel B of Table 4, the 
coefficient on the two-way interaction term CFOt×Coveraget is positive, suggesting that firms 
are less likely to smooth income when Coverage is high and therefore unemployment risk is low. 
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Moreover, the coefficient on the three-way interaction term, CFOt×UIt-1×Coveraget, is negative 
across all specifications, as predicted in hypothesis H2.  
In sum, results of Table 4 strongly support our hypothesis H2 that the negative 
association between income smoothing and UI benefits is stronger (weaker) when risk of 
unemployment is high (low).    
[Insert Table 4] 
 4.3 Test of H3: The Effect of Information and Internal Control Environment 
Our final hypothesis (H3) posits that firms’ ability to engage in income smoothing is 
curtailed in environments with strong information and internal controls. Therefore, we expect the 
role of UI benefits in reducing income smoothing behavior to be limited in such contexts.  
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is probably the most significant 
event to impact firms’ information and internal control environments during our sample period. 
Two of the act’s most salient provisions in this regard are Sections 302 and 404. Section 302 
mandates that CEOs and CFOs to take personal responsibility in ensuring that firms establish and 
maintain strong internal controls. Moreover, CEOs and CFOs are required to certify the material 
accuracy and completeness of financial statements. There are significant penalties for CEOs and 
CFOs who knowingly certify financial statements that do not meet SOX requirements. These can 
include up to $5,000,000 in fines and 20 years in prison. SOX Section 404 requires that annual 
reports include an internal control report that states that management is responsible for 
establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial 
reporting and that contains an assessment of the above mentioned structures and procedures. 
Moreover, external auditors are required to provide an independent opinion on their client’s 
internal controls over financial reporting.  
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In sum, SOX has strengthened the controls over firms’ financial reporting and imposed 
significant costs for noncompliance. Consistent with SOX improving firms’ financial reporting 
quality and having a significant negative impact on discretionary reporting behavior, a number of 
studies find that the use of accruals for earnings management has reduced post SOX (e.g., see 
Bartov and Cohen, 2009; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009; 
Lobo and Zhou, 2006).  
Accordingly, in testing hypothesis H3, we first investigate whether the role of UI benefits 
in reducing income smoothing is lower in post-SOX periods compared to pre-SOX periods. 
Second, we focus on the post-SOX period and exploit the SOX Section 404 provision of auditor 
attestation of internal controls to distinguish between firms with strong versus weak internal 
control environments.21 Prior literature establishes a strong relation between auditor-attested 
SOX Section 404 internal control weaknesses and accruals quality (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2008; Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 2007). In line with hypothesis H3, we predict the role of UI 
benefits in constraining income smoothing behavior to be stronger for firms that auditors have 
identified as having material internal control weaknesses.22  
We test hypothesis H3 by introducing the variables SOX and ICW into Eq. (4) along with 
the three-way interaction terms, CFOt×UIt-1×SOXt and CFOt×UIt-1×ICW, and the related two-
way interactions. SOX takes the value of one for observations in the post-SOX period, and zero 
for the others. ICW is a firm-level variable that takes the value of 1 if the auditor identifies the 
firm as having material internal control weaknesses, and zero otherwise. Hypothesis H3 predicts 
a negative coefficient on the three-way interaction term CFOt×UIt-1×SOXt and a positive 
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 This requirement results in a significant reduction in sample size since we are only focusing on post-SOX 
observations with information about whether the firm has internal control weakness.  
22
 We obtain data on internal control weaknesses from Audit Analytics.  
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coefficient on the three-way interaction term CFOt×UIt-1×ICW. Specifically, we employ the 
following models for our tests of hypothesis H3: 
Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt×UIt-1×SOXt + β2UIt-1×SOXt + β3CFOt×SOXt + β4SOXt + β5CFOt×UIt-
1 + β6CFOt + β7UIt-1 + βnControls + e.        (7) 
Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt×UIt-1×ICW + β2UIt-1×ICW + β3CFOt×ICW + β4ICW + β5CFOt×UIt-1 
+ β6CFOt + β7UIt-1 + βnControls + e.       (8) 
The results for tests of hypothesis H3 are presented in Table 5. Panel A of Table 5 reports 
results for pre- versus post-SOX analyses, while the results relating to internal control weakness 
(ICW) are reported in Panel B of Table 5. In Table 5, Panel A, we find the coefficient on the two-
way interaction term CFOt×SOXt to be positive, indicating that income smoothing has gone 
down in post-SOX periods and confirming the evidence from prior literature that SOX has 
inhibited the use of accruals for earnings management. More importantly, the coefficient on the 
three-way interaction term CFOt×UIt-1×SOXt, our coefficient of interest, is negative and 
significant as predicted across all specifications. This result suggests that the role of UI benefits 
in reducing income smoothing is lower in post-SOX periods where firms’ information 
environments and internal controls are expected to be stronger on average.  
We find further support for hypothesis H3 in Panel B of Table 5, where we report our 
findings on ICW. As conjectured, the coefficient on the three-way interaction term CFOt×UIt-
1×ICW is positive and significant, indicating that UI benefits result in a greater reduction of 
income smoothing in firms with internal control weaknesses, where the likelihood of exercising 
discretion over financial reporting is higher. Accordingly, the results reported in Table 5 support 
hypothesis H3: the negative association between income smoothing and UI benefits is weaker 
(stronger) when firms’ information environments and internal controls are strong (weak).  
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[Insert Table 5] 
4.4  Additional Analyses 
4.4.1 Imposition of firm and state fixed effects 
As explained in Section 3.4, we employ year, industry, and industry-state fixed effects in 
our main empirical analyses. While we believe these to be the most relevant controls in the 
context of our study, we also examine whether our results are robust to year and firm fixed 
effects. A related issue is whether time-invariant state-level factors play a role in the 
hypothesized relations, as opposed to the state-level industry concentration that we have 
conjectured and controlled via industry-state fixed effects. In Table 6, we report the sensitivity of 
our primary hypotheses when we control for firm and state fixed effects. As can be seen from 
Table 6, our inferences remain unchanged, and we continue to find that UI benefits attenuate 
income smoothing behavior. In untabulated analyses, we also confirm that our findings for 
hypotheses H2 and H3 are not sensitive to our choice of fixed effects.  
[Insert Table 6] 
4.4.2 Control for other state-level factors and dispersed workforce 
Our primary analyses control for state-level GDP growth. In untabulated analyses, we 
employ additional state-level controls of the state unemployment rate and the percentage of the 
state population claiming unemployment benefits. Despite the use of these controls resulting in 
smaller sample sizes, we continue to find results supporting all our hypotheses.  Further, as 
indicated in Section 3.1, we assign firms to states based on the location of the firms’ 
headquarters. This criteria creates some measurement error if some of the firms’ workers are 
located outside of the headquarters state. In order to mitigate this concern, we follow Agrawal 
and Matsa (2013) and exclude from our analyses industries with dispersed workforces. Agrawal 
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and Matsa (2013) identify retail, wholesale, and transportation as industries with more dispersed 
workforces. Again, untabulated results show that when we use this restricted sample, all our 
results continue to hold.  
4.4.3 Impact on financial reporting quality 
This paper argues that unemployment concerns exacerbate firms’ discretionary reporting 
behavior in terms of income smoothing. If, as argued, unemployment concerns indeed give rise 
to the creation of precautionary reserves during good times and the release of these reserves 
during bad times, then these concerns should have a negative impact on the firms’ financial 
reporting quality.23 Hence, to the extent that UI benefits alleviate income smoothing behavior, 
they should also result in improving the financial reporting quality of the firm. We next 
investigate this conjecture. In order to do so, we use variants of two empirical proxies of 
financial reporting quality. 
Our first proxy is financial statement opacity (opacity), introduced by Hutton, Marcus, 
and Tehranian (2009). They measure opacity for year t as the absolute value of abnormal 
accruals for the three-year-period t-1, t, and t+1, where abnormal accruals are estimated based on 
the cross-sectional modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Jones, 1991).  
We use two modifications of this approach to capture opacity. In the first modification, we 
capture opacity as the mean of abnormal accruals over the three-year window of t to t+2 
(3yr_Opacity).24 In the second modification, we relax the requirement of an arbitrary time 
window and capture opacity for period t as the mean of abnormal accruals from t to t+n-1, where 
n is the number of years before UI benefits subsequently change (Fwd_Opacity). Fwd_Opacity 
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 Here, we identify financial reporting quality as the ability of financial statements to present the true economic 
performance of a firm in a given period.  
24
 We bring forward the time window by one year because a firm is unlikely to alter income smoothing behavior 
prior to UI benefits being changed.  
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assumes that opacity remains unchanged until a change in UI benefits occurs. The advantage of 
this second measure is that it better captures changes in reporting behavior directly due to 
changes in UI benefits.  
We use accruals quality (AQ), measured as the standard deviation of abnormal accruals 
over a period of time, as our second proxy of financial reporting quality. Higher standard 
deviations imply lower AQ. Following prior literature, abnormal accruals are captured as the 
firm-specific residual from a cross-sectional regression of accruals on prior, current, and future 
operating cash flows as well as changes in revenue and PP&E (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; 
Francis et al., 2005; McNichols, 2002). We define 3yr_AQ and Fwd_AQ by computing standard 
deviations over time windows that correspond to 3yr_Opacity and Fwd_Opacity, respectively.  
We regress our four constructs of financial reporting quality on the lagged UI benefits 
(UIt-1), log of assets (Log_Assetst) and state-level GDP growth (GDP_Growtht).25 These results 
are reported in Table 7. As can be seen, the results across all four measures are in line with our 
conjecture. The coefficient on UIt-1 with 3yr_Opacity, 3yr_AQ, Fwd_Opacity, and Fwd_AQ as 
dependent variables is negative and significant for all three specifications, suggesting that UI 
benefits have a positive impact on firms’ financial reporting quality. It appears that because UI 
benefits reduce firms’ income smoothing activities, they also result in an improvement of 
financial reporting quality.   
[Insert Table 7] 
5.  Conclusion 
The labor theory on compensating wage differentials suggests that firms have incentives 
to reduce the actual and/or perceived unemployment risk of workers because, ex-ante, this would 
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 We do not employ the other control variables used in our previous specifications because those are already in the 
model used to derive abnormal accruals.  
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lower the cost of compensating the workers. Using exogenous inter-state cross-sectional and 
intra-state time-series variations in U.S. UI benefits to identify changes in unemployment 
concerns, we show that more generous state UI benefits, which reduce workers’ concerns about 
unemployment risk, result in less income smoothing by firms. This effect of UI benefits on 
income smoothing is interesting because it is likely to be an unintended outcome of state-level 
labor policies. It is difficult to imagine that policy makers, in their deliberations about UI 
policies, explicitly consider the firm-level financial reporting implications of their decisions 
(which, in turn, could have other consequences, such as a lower cost of capital and higher 
financial reporting quality). To add richness to our study about the effect of UI benefits on 
income smoothing, we show that the relation is stronger when workers face higher firm-level 
unemployment risk and weaker when the firm’s information and internal control environment is 
strong. These additional results further corroborate our main finding that workers’ 
unemployment concerns play an influential role in firms’ financial reporting outcomes.  
Reverse causality and endogeneity are serious concerns that preclude the researcher from 
making strong causal inferences in empirical studies in financial economics. While our study is 
not completely devoid of these concerns, we believe that our institutional setting and research 
design choices allay them to a great extent. First, since we capture UI benefits at the state level, it 
is unlikely that reverse causality explains our results; it is difficult to imagine a situation where 
UI benefits at the state level are affected by income smoothing at the firm level.  
Second, it is conceptually plausible to conceive of broader economic factors that affect 
both UI benefits and firms’ income smoothing behavior, thereby raising concerns about omitted 
correlated variables. But from a practical stand-point, it appears that changes in UI benefits are 
driven more by political considerations than by underlying economics. For example, in the state 
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of Florida, maximum UI benefits remained constant over the 1998-2011 period, despite notable 
fluctuations in the economy, whereas states such as Connecticut and Massachusetts increased 
their UI benefits almost annually during the same period. Lending support to this notion, 
Agrawal and Matsa (2013) report that in contrast to broader economic indicators, there are no 
regional trends in UI benefits. Moreover, in all our analyses, we control for GDP growth rates to 
capture statewide economic conditions and employ year fixed effects to control for broad time 
series trends. Further, our findings remain robust to the use of industry-state fixed effects to 
control for industry concentration at the state level, which likely varies over time, as well as the 
use of industry and state fixed effects to control for time-invariant industry and state factors. 26  
Third, lending support for a causal relation, we obtain the expected results for all our cross-
sectional tests, which examine conditions under which income smoothing related to UI benefits 
are likely to be more/less pronounced.  
How firms’ financial reporting outcomes are shaped by concerns about members of the 
workforce is an important issue because accounting standard setters identify employees as an 
important user group of financial statements. Yet, empirical evidence in this regard is scant in the 
corporate disclosure literature. Meanwhile, both labor economists and regulators alike are likely 
interested in the broader, unintended effects of labor market interventions, such as UI programs. 
Seen in this light, we believe this paper to be of interest to a broad array of audiences. While our 
paper indicates a link between UI benefits and accruals-based financial reporting decisions, it is 
plausible that UI benefits influence earnings management decisions through real actions (i.e., 
real earnings management) as well. We leave the exploration of this issue to future research.  
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 We also employ firm fixed effects to ensure that results are not driven by time-invariant firm factors. 
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Figure 1 Relative Increases in UI by Decade, 1963-2011  
This figure displays the quartile of a state’s increase in maximum total benefits from 1963 to 2011. Maximum total benefits is the 
product of the stautory maximum weekly UI benefit and the maxium duration. The first (fourth) quartile indicates the lowest (highest) 
increase in benefit. 
 
  1st Quartile   2nd Quartile   3rd Quartile   4th Quartile 
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Figure 2 Distribution of State Increases in UI, 1963-2011 
This figure shows the distribution of state increases in their UI benefits over each decade from 1963 to 2011. The percent change in UI 
benefit is defined as the increase in maximum total benefits for each decade. There are 255 state-decade observations, including 
Washington D.C. 
 
 
 
12%
36%
21%
12%
6%
5%
4%
3%
0-25%
25.1%-50%
50.1%-75%
75.1%-100%
100.1%-125%
125.1%-150%
150.1%-175%
>175%
40 
 
 
Table 1 Panel A: Average Unemployment Insurance Benefits by State 
   
      
State 
Max 
Weekly 
Benefit 
Max Duration Unemployment Insurance State 
Max Weekly 
Benefit Max Duration 
Unemployment 
Insurance 
Alabama 132 26 3,427 Montana 180 26 4,793 
Alaska 225 27 5,911 Nebraska 148 26 3,841 
Arizona 136 26 3,534 Nevada 187 26 4,867 
Arkansas 198 26 5,149 New Hampshire 186 26 4,828 
California 200 26 5,199 New Jersey 260 26 6,757 
Colorado 223 26 5,809 New Mexico 181 27 4,796 
Connecticut 295 26 7,678 New York 217 26 5,630 
Delaware 197 26 5,112 North Carolina 221 26 5,743 
District of Columbia 228 29 6,321 North Dakota 189 26 4,919 
Florida 167 26 4,333 Ohio 258 26 6,713 
Georgia 161 26 4,182 Oklahoma 186 28 4,920 
Hawaii 248 26 6,440 Oregon 226 26 5,880 
Idaho 185 26 4,805 Pennsylvania 267 28 7,110 
Illinois 254 26 6,608 Rhode Island 294 26 7,651 
Indiana 181 26 4,701 South Carolina 161 25 4,158 
Iowa 212 27 5,631 South Dakota 144 26 3,746 
Kansas 201 26 5,223 Tennessee 152 26 3,948 
Kentucky 187 26 4,855 Texas 190 26 4,950 
Louisiana 163 27 4,319 Utah 209 30 5,776 
Maine 238 26 6,178 Vermont 186 26 4,841 
Maryland 186 26 4,841 Virginia 174 26 4,528 
Massachusetts 393 30 11,785 Washington 249 29 7,181 
Michigan 216 26 5,603 West Virginia 217 26 5,697 
Minnesota 249 26 6,470 Wisconsin 203 29 5,626 
Mississippi 125 26 3,259 Wyoming 186 26 4,848 
Missouri 149 26 3,884     
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Table 1 Panel B: Unemployment Insurance Benefits by Year, 1963-2011  
           
Year N 
Max 
Weekly 
Benefit 
Max 
Duration 
 Max  
UI 
 Benefits 
Year N 
Max 
Weekly 
Benefit 
Max Duration 
Max  
UI  
Benefits 
1963 868 42.64 26.67 1,145.71 1988 3,963 194.64 26.04 5,090.42 
1964 944 42.72 26.67 1,147.71 1989 3,902 203.62 26.04 5,326.34 
1965 1,046 43.53 26.71 1,170.25 1990 3,896 214.19 26.04 5,605.13 
1966 1,223 46.12 26.71 1,238.46 1991 3,927 222.17 26.04 5,813.32 
1967 1,306 47.77 26.75 1,285.58 1992 4,176 233.32 26.15 6,119.32 
1968 1,422 51.02 26.79 1,371.58 1993 4,476 242.15 26.15 6,351.85 
1969 1,542 53.67 26.79 1,442.38 1994 4,695 251.40 26.15 6,598.72 
1970 1,627 57.92 26.92 1,563.69 1995 4,899 257.32 26.15 6,754.26 
1971 1,715 62.40 26.77 1,678.27 1996 5,178 264.17 26.15 6,934.15 
1972 2,066 70.15 26.77 1,894.00 1997 5,050 272.66 26.15 7,157.70 
1973 2,463 73.73 26.77 1,991.85 1998 4,696 280.23 26.15 7,358.11 
1974 2,789 80.46 26.77 2,172.19 1999 4,496 291.26 26.15 7,647.06 
1975 2,819 88.46 26.77 2,388.19 2000 4,328 299.47 26.15 7,863.55 
1976 2,850 98.50 27.02 2,683.37 2001 4,033 322.77 26.15 8,479.36 
1977 2,843 106.62 27.02 2,903.54 2002 3,738 336.23 26.15 8,837.28 
1978 2,818 113.57 27.00 3,092.53 2003 3,584 347.85 26.15 9,138.87 
1979 2,899 119.79 27.00 3,264.09 2004 3,526 357.62 26.15 9,393.13 
1980 2,934 128.92 26.72 3,474.91 2005 3,423 365.64 26.11 9,578.04 
1981 3,114 139.85 26.68 3,763.85 2006 3,325 376.02 26.11 9,848.26 
1982 3,237 151.62 26.68 4,081.25 2007 3,253 388.00 26.11 10,166.72 
1983 3,427 160.91 26.49 4,299.40 2008 3,096 404.81 26.11 10,607.58 
1984 3,639 167.32 26.08 4,384.19 2009 2,936 420.17 26.11 11,010.87 
1985 3,726 173.87 26.08 4,554.45 2010 2,853 427.55 26.11 11,203.32 
1986 3,858 181.91 26.04 4,756.53 2011 2,754 428.58 26.11 11,229.81 
1987 4,026 187.62 26.04 4,907.21           
 
Panel A (B) shows the distribution of unemployment insurance allowed by state (year). UI is the average of the maximum unemployment benefit allowed, 
defined as the product of the maximum weekly benefit times the maximum number of weeks allowed.  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
     
      
 
Mean Standard Deviation 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 
Accrualst -0.035 0.106 -0.080 -0.034 0.011 
CFOt 0.017 0.212 -0.014 0.064 0.120 
UIt-1 0.661 0.401 0.382 0.598 0.858 
CFOt-1 0.027 0.193 -0.006 0.067 0.122 
CFOt+1 0.026 0.199 -0.005 0.067 0.122 
∆Revenuet 0.114 0.313 -0.009 0.084 0.233 
PP&Et 0.586 0.389 0.280 0.508 0.834 
Log_Assetst 4.832 2.137 3.300 4.699 6.270 
GDP_Growtht 6.640 3.634 4.340 6.450 8.820 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the study. Accruals is total accruals divided by total assets. CFO
 
is cash flow from operations 
divided by total assets. UI is the maximum unemployment benefit allowed, defined as the product of maximum weekly benefits times the maximum number of 
weeks allowed. ∆Revenue is change in sales divided by total assets. PP&E is property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Log_Assets is the natural log 
of total assets. GDP_Growth is state-level growth in GDP. Number of observations = 155,404.  
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Table 3: Impact of Unemployment Insurance on Income Smoothing 
           
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst 
CFOt×UIt-1 0.136*** 0.120*** 0.149*** 0.134*** 
 
(3.00) (3.11) (3.05) (3.17) 
CFOt -0.240*** -0.411*** -0.258*** -0.423*** 
 
(-5.86) (-10.08) (-5.83) (-9.72) 
UIt-1 0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 
(1.01) (0.34) (-0.47) (-0.72) 
CFOt-1 
 
0.159*** 
 
0.157*** 
  
(22.70) 
 
(22.50) 
CFOt+1 
 
0.124*** 
 
0.123*** 
  
(25.61) 
 
(26.20) 
∆Revenuet 0.116*** 0.112*** 0.116*** 0.112*** 
 
(27.53) (22.37) (26.86) (21.92) 
PP&Et -0.049*** -0.057*** -0.051*** -0.058*** 
 
(-21.65) (-28.83) (-19.52) (-25.77) 
Log_Assetst 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 
 
(27.79) (9.39) (26.78) (9.05) 
GDP_Growtht 0.000** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(2.56) (3.03) (4.96) (4.60) 
     
Year Fixed Effects     
Industry Fixed Effects   
  
Industry-state Fixed Effects 
  
  
Observations 155,404 128,856 155,404 128,856 
R-squared 0.2767 0.4066 0.2943 0.4230 
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This table presents regression results on income smoothing. Accrualst is total accruals in t-1. UIt-1 is maximum total benefits in t-1. CFOt is cash flow from 
operations in t. CFOt-1 is cash flow from operations in t-1. CFOt+1 is cash flow from operations in t+1. See Table 2 for other variable definitions. We include year 
and industry (industry-state) fixed effects in columns 1-2 (3-4). We report coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors 
clustered by state. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 4 Panel A: The Role of Leverage 
     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst 
CFOt× UIt-1×Leveraget 0.114*** 0.122*** 0.105*** 0.112*** 
 
(3.56) (3.56) (3.45) (3.38) 
UIt-1×Leveraget 0.004* 0.001 0.006*** 0.003* 
 
(1.95) (0.74) (2.89) (1.81) 
CFOt×Leveraget -0.174*** -0.164*** -0.164*** -0.155*** 
 
(-5.22) (-6.49) (-5.17) (-6.31) 
Leveraget -0.017*** -0.009*** -0.020*** -0.012*** 
 
(-7.61) (-7.17) (-8.82) (-9.45) 
CFOt×UIt-1 0.099*** 0.085*** 0.115*** 0.102*** 
 
(2.78) (2.78) (2.89) (2.89) 
CFOt -0.189*** -0.361*** -0.209*** -0.375*** 
 
(-6.23) (-10.52) (-6.15) (-9.89) 
UIt-1 0.002 -0.000 -0.005 -0.004 
 
(0.46) (-0.20) (-1.00) (-1.07) 
CFOt-1 
 
0.150*** 
 
0.149*** 
  
(23.38) 
 
(22.88) 
CFOt+1 
 
0.119*** 
 
0.118*** 
  
(32.05) 
 
(32.18) 
∆Revenuet 0.112*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.108*** 
 (25.81) (21.70) (25.55) (21.43) 
PP&Et -0.046*** -0.054*** -0.048*** -0.055*** 
 (-20.63) (-28.03) (-18.62) (-24.66) 
Log_Assetst 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.004*** 
 (26.57) (9.71) (25.57) (9.42) 
GDP_Growtht 0.000* 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (1.72) (2.38) (3.68) (3.72) 
     Year Fixed Effects     
Industry Fixed Effects   
  Industry-state Fixed Effects 
  
  
Observations 152,688 126,803 152,688 126,803 
R-squared 0.2885 0.4145 0.3062 0.4311 
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Table 4 Panel B: The Role of Collective Bargaining Agreements 
     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst 
CFOt× UIt-1×Coveraget -0.174*** -0.144*** -0.181*** -0.152*** 
 
(-3.56) (-3.13) (-3.44) (-3.04) 
UIt-1×Coveraget 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.77) (1.09) (-0.14) (-0.01) 
CFOt×Coveraget 0.123** 0.097* 0.130** 0.103* 
 
(2.53) (1.99) (2.52) (1.99) 
Coveraget -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 
(-0.88) (-0.70) (-0.52) (-0.86) 
CFOt×UIt-1 0.259*** 0.224*** 0.274*** 0.242*** 
 
(6.98) (6.64) (6.97) (6.72) 
CFOt -0.309*** -0.459*** -0.330*** -0.474*** 
 
(-11.95) (-17.14) (-12.44) (-17.47) 
UIt-1 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.002 
 
(0.04) (-0.71) (0.04) (0.26) 
CFOt-1 
 
0.152*** 
 
0.151*** 
  
(21.48) 
 
(21.05) 
CFOt+1 
 
0.122*** 
 
0.121*** 
  
(22.41) 
 
(22.70) 
∆Revenuet 0.118*** 0.114*** 0.118*** 0.114*** 
 (26.88) (21.40) (26.00) (20.85) 
PP&Et -0.049*** -0.057*** -0.051*** -0.057*** 
 (-22.48) (-29.11) (-22.04) (-27.18) 
Log_Assetst 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 
 (27.15) (8.32) (24.33) (7.50) 
GDP_Growtht 0.000** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (2.40) (3.23) (5.53) (4.83) 
     Year Fixed Effects     
Industry Fixed Effects   
  Industry-state Fixed Effects 
  
  
Observations 133,574 109,812 133,574 109,812 
R-squared 0.2513 0.3782 0.2692 0.3953 
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This table presents regression results on income smoothing and firm risk. Panel A (B) reports results on how the relation between income smoothing and UI 
benefits is affected by leverage (collective bargaining agreements). Accrualst is total accruals in t-1. UIt-1 is maximum total benefits in t-1. CFOt is cash flow 
from operations in t. CFOt-1 is cash flow from operations in t-1. CFOt+1 is cash flow from operations in t+1. Leveraget is total debt divided by market value of 
equity in t. Coveraget is the percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements in t. See Table 2 for other variable definitions. We include 
year and industry (industry-state) fixed effects in columns 1-5 (6-10). We report coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard 
errors clustered by state. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5 Panel A: The Impact of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 
     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst 
CFOt× UIt-1×SOXt -0.265*** -0.236*** -0.265*** -0.238*** 
 
(-2.69) (-2.89) (-2.72) (-2.94) 
UIt-1×SOXt -0.010 -0.001 -0.007 0.001 
 
(-1.55) (-0.20) (-1.07) (0.16) 
CFOt×SOXt 0.241*** 0.224*** 0.232*** 0.219*** 
 
(4.01) (4.47) (4.05) (4.51) 
SOXt -0.051*** -0.039*** -0.050*** -0.038*** 
 
(-10.65) (-9.62) (-8.93) (-7.62) 
CFOt×UIt-1 0.281*** 0.253*** 0.300*** 0.273*** 
 
(2.95) (3.18) (2.98) (3.23) 
CFOt -0.338*** -0.502*** -0.358*** -0.516*** 
 
(-5.36) (-8.76) (-5.38) (-8.58) 
UIt-1 0.009 -0.000 0.002 -0.004 
 
(1.18) (-0.01) (0.21) (-0.55) 
CFOt-1 
 
0.155*** 
 
0.154*** 
  
(23.71) 
 
(23.60) 
CFOt+1 
 
0.122*** 
 
0.120*** 
  
(27.91) 
 
(28.89) 
     Controls     
Year Fixed Effects     
Industry Fixed Effects   
  Industry-state Fixed Effects 
  
  
Observations 155,404 128,856 155,404 128,856 
R-squared 0.2852 0.4134 0.3026 0.4296 
     
 
 
 
  
49 
 
Table 5 Panel B: The Impact of Internal Control Weaknesses 
     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst 
CFOt× UIt-1×ICWt 0.051** 0.067** 0.043** 0.063** 
 
(2.62) (2.22) (2.44) (2.16) 
UIt-1×ICWt 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.67) (0.89) (-0.48) (0.00) 
CFOt×ICWt -0.062** -0.064 -0.044 -0.056 
 
(-2.14) (-1.54) (-1.54) (-1.43) 
ICWt -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.011** -0.012** 
 
(-4.39) (-3.53) (-2.38) (-2.22) 
CFOt×UIt-1 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.025** 0.023** 
 
(2.97) (2.99) (2.54) (2.23) 
CFOt -0.104*** -0.217*** -0.115*** -0.216*** 
 
(-5.45) (-8.50) (-4.79) (-7.55) 
UIt-1 -0.003** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.002 
 
(-2.34) (-2.77) (-0.47) (-0.42) 
CFOt-1 
 
0.096*** 
 
0.097*** 
  
(14.86) 
 
(14.30) 
CFOt+1 
 
0.078*** 
 
0.077*** 
  
(9.89) 
 
(10.31) 
     Controls     
Year Fixed Effects     
Industry Fixed Effects   
  Industry-state Fixed Effects 
  
  
Observations 21,326 19,024 21,326 19,024 
R-squared 0.2189 0.3012 0.2740 0.3526 
     
 
This table presents regression results on income smoothing and the information and internal control environment. Panel A (B) reports results on how the relation 
between income smoothing and UI benefits is affected by the enactment of Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (presence of material internal control weaknesses). 
Accrualst is total accruals in t-1. UIt-1 is maximum total benefits in t-1. CFOt is cash flow from operations in t. CFOt-1 is cash flow from operations in t-1. CFOt+1 
is cash flow from operations in t+1. SOXt is an indicator variable equal to one for the post-SOX period, and zero otherwise. ICW is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the firm reports an internal control weakness, and zero otherwise. See Table 2 for other variable definitions. We include year and industry (industry-state) 
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fixed effects in columns 1-4 (5-8). We report coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by state. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 6: Analyses with Firm and State Fixed Effects 
   
       
 
(1) (2) (5) (3) (4) (6) 
 
Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst 
CFOt×UIt-1 0.213*** 0.143*** 0.137*** 0.195*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 
 
(3.44) (3.06) (3.00) (3.30) (3.07) (3.10) 
CFOt -0.440*** -0.245*** -0.243*** -0.491*** -0.416*** -0.412*** 
 
(-8.05) (-5.78) (-5.91) (-9.23) (-10.02) (-10.11) 
UIt-1 -0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.001 -0.000 
 
(-0.69) (0.13) (0.12) (-1.37) (0.32) (-0.03) 
CFOt-1 
   
0.138*** 0.155*** 0.158*** 
    
(27.22) (22.22) (22.35) 
CFOt+1 
   
0.099*** 0.123*** 0.124*** 
    
(30.41) (23.93) (24.91) 
∆Revenue 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.112*** 
 
(19.35) (27.20) (27.25) (18.29) (22.31) (22.24) 
PP&E -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.054*** -0.057*** 
 
(-14.22) (-24.60) (-20.38) (-14.10) (-28.32) (-27.27) 
Log Assets 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 
(16.55) (30.22) (25.31) (12.51) (10.97) (8.69) 
GDP Growth 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(4.92) (5.37) (4.93) (4.48) (5.37) (4.85) 
       
Year Fixed Effects       
Firm Fixed Effects  
  
 
  
State Fixed Effects 
 
  
 
  
Industry Fixed Effects 
  
 
  
 
Observations 155,404 155,404 155,404 128,856 128,856 128,856 
R-squared 0.4733 0.2632 0.2787 0.5296 0.3915 0.4079 
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This table presents regression results on income smoothing with alternative time-invariant controls. Accrualst is total accruals in t-1. UIt-1 is maximum total 
benefits in t-1. CFOt is cash flow from operations in t. CFOt-1 is cash flow from operations in t-1. CFOt+1 is cash flow from operations in t+1. See Table 2 for 
other variable definitions. We report coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by state. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 7: Unemployment Insurance and Financial Reporting Quality 
     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
3yr_Opacityt 3yr_AQt Fwd_Opacityt Fwd_AQt 
UIt-1 -0.005** -0.005* -0.007*** -0.010*** 
 
(-2.48) (-1.82) (-3.98) (-3.32) 
Log_Assetst -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.014*** 
 
(-22.00) (-19.90) (-29.43) (-26.35) 
GDP_Growtht 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
 
(2.02) (1.08) (3.34) (1.63) 
     Year Fixed Effects     
Industry Fixed Effects     
Observations 114,235 114,235 145,600 131,341 
R-squared 0.1910 0.1620 0.2025 0.2032 
 
This table presents regression results on earnings opacity. 3yr_Opacityt (3yr_AQt) is the mean (standard deviation) of absolute abnormal accruals from t to t+2. 
Fwd_Opacityt (Fwd_AQt) is the mean (standard deviation) of absolute abnormal accruals from t to t+n-1, where t+n is the first year of increase in unemployment 
benefits. UIt-1 is maximum total benefits in t-1. See Table 2 for other variable definitions. We include year and industry fixed effects in all specifications. We 
report coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by state. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
